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Abstract 
We investigate firm-level determinants of capital structure using a large sample of 4,284 
Japanese firms over a nineteen-year period (i.e., over 61,000 firm-year observations), a hitherto 
less examined sample for this purpose. We conduct our analysis and interpret our findings 
predominantly within the pecking order, the trade-off and the agency theoretical frameworks. 
We uncover three new findings. First, our evidence indicates that insights derived from the 
extant literature on capital structure are cross-national and are applicable in the context of 
Japan, despite the unique characteristics of Japanese firms. Second, financial crisis 
significantly impacts the relationship between leverage and firm-level determinants, 
particularly accentuating the effect of asset tangibility and growth. Third, product market 
competition significantly impacts the observed relationship between firm-level determinants 
and leverage. Our results are robust, controlling for the joint effects of competition and crisis.  
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1. Introduction 
Within the realm of corporate finance, Modigliani and Miller’s (1958, 1963) irrelevance theory 
forms the basis for empirical and theoretical studies on the financing decisions of firms. The 
central proposition of the irrelevance theory is that the value of a firm is not driven by its capital 
structure (Frank and Shen, 2019; Grosse-Rueschkamp et al., 2019). Although based on 
restrictive assumptions, the irrelevance theory inspired the development of further theories , 
including the pecking order and the trade-off theories (Antill and Grenadier, 2019; Chen et al., 
2019; Nicodano and Regis, 2019). These subsequent theoretical developments suggest that the 
choice of capital structure is not random (Inderst and Vladimirov, 2019; Ji et al., 2019; 
Lemmon and Zender, 2019). Whilst this claim has received support from a large body of 
literature suggesting that firms’ characteristics affect their capital structure decisions (e.g., 
Ahmed and Hla, 2019; Asad et al., 2019; Danso and Adomako, 2014; Fosu, 2013; Muradoğlu 
& Sivaprasad, 2012; Céspedes et al., 2010; De Jong et al. 2008; Ranasinghe, 2019; Wang et 
al., 2019), it is reasonable to argue that other, unexplored, factors, such as financial crisis and 
product market characteristics may also influence capital structure (Alexandridis and Hasan, 
2019; Elmagrhi et al., 2018; Harris and Roark, 2019). This naturally raises some questions: (i) 
Would the traditional capital structure determinants remain important in product markets in 
which firms traditionally enjoy special lending relationships with large major banks; and (ii) 
Would the traditional capital structure determinants remain important, where firms belong to 
large industrial groupings and are subject, largely, to effective monitoring? We address these 
questions through a focus on the capital structure decisions of Japanese firms.  
The unique characteristics of Japanese firms that set them apart from their counterparts in other 
developed countries helps to enrich our paper’s perspective. In particular, a considerable 
number of Japanese firms belong to industrial groupings, known as ‘Keiretsu’. These firms 
form a special relationship, often led by a major affiliated bank, aimed at their mutual success 
(Choi et al. 2014; Dakua, 2019; Hatani and McGaughey, 2013; Nakateni, 1984). Further, these 
firms have cross-ownership of each other, fostering close business ties (Frank and Shen, 2019; 
Prowse, 1992; Nakateni, 1984). Such cross-ownerships and banking relationships also foster 
peer-monitoring, thereby minimising information asymmetry, mitigating the associated agency 
problems, and reducing the cost of financial distress (Ji et al., 2019; Kester, 1986; Nakateni, 
1984). Thus, unlike market-based economies, such as the USA and UK, the prevalence of 
industrial groupings around major affiliated banks has the tendency to shape corporate 
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financing in a way that defies the traditional capital structure theories. For instance, the agency 
costs of debt (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), could be lower for several firms, regardless of key 
firm-specific attributes. Additionally, the ownership structure of Japanese banks permits a 
culture of over-reliance on bank financing. Major banks, both local and international, tend to 
be key shareholders, serving as the main providers of funds, and are responsible for monitor ing 
the performance of the client firms (Chen et al., 2019; Kang and Shivdasani, 1995; Aoki, 1990; 
Sheard, 1989). This mechanism should help in aligning the incentives of a firm’s key 
stakeholders, ensuring that the firm is appropriately leveraged. Since the 1970s, however, the 
reliance on bank finance is becoming less pronounced, as noted in Ketser (1986), whilst the 
proportion of finance generated internally has been rising, suggesting that the agency 
relationship in Japanese firms is changing due to reduced scrutiny by banks. Further, bank 
loans to Japanese firms tend to be of short maturity and often incorporate covenants, with long-
term debt that is either secured on collateral or indentured (Kester, 1986). Such indentures 
contain a pledge not to secure another long-term debt ahead of it, or to limit the amount of the 
other long-term debt that can be obtained. As noted by Kester (1986), the short maturity of debt 
mitigates agency problems and permits firms to have relatively higher levels of leverage. It is 
also, noteworthy, that the indentures contained in the long-term debts also reduce the 
monitoring costs of leverage. 
Therefore, it could be argued that the ownership structure and the lending relationship with 
major banks shield Japanese firms from competitive pressure. Traditionally, competit ive 
pressure, or the lack of it, drives corporate capital structure (e.g., Chevalier and Scharfstein, 
1996; Chevalier, 1995a, 1995b; Bolton and Scharfstein, 1990; Brander and Lewis, 1986; 
Fudenberg and Tirole, 1986; Inderst and Vladimirov, 2019). For instance, Brander and Lewis 
(1986) argue that leverage drives aggressive competition in product markets. Further, leverage 
creates an opportunity for large incumbent firms in concentrated (or less competit ive) 
industries to predate on their smaller, financially constrained counterparts (see, Ahmed & Hla, 
2019; Bolton and Scharfstein, 1990; Fudenberg and Tirole, 1986). For instance, to mitiga te 
agency problems, optimal debt contracting is designed to require periodic payments. However, 
the likelihood of a leveraged firm’s exit following its failure to make repayments attracts 
incumbent firms to predate on the leveraged firm by undercutting the price of the latter. This 
would normally not happen, or would be discouraged, in competitive markets, as each firm 
accounts for only a small proportion of the market. Consistent with this view, Chevalier and 
Scharfstein (1996) show that leverage limits the ability of firms to invest in their market share. 
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They show particularly that more leveraged firms charge higher prices during recession than 
their less leveraged counterparts. Similarly, Fosu (2013) shows that the impact of leverage on 
firm performance is moderated by competition. 
 
Whilst the foregoing discussions indicate that product market competition influences the 
capital structure of firms, with the tendency for lower levels of leverage in concentrated or less 
competitive markets, the ownership structure and the special bank lending relationship enjoyed 
by Japanese firms make a special case for this study. Further, the interaction of leverage and 
recession, or economic downturns, makes a study of Japanese firms overdue. For instance, 
Japan was the worst affected economy in terms of reduced exports during the 2007-2008 global 
financial crisis and suffered a 6% fall in GDP, resulting in the lowest point of growth since the 
1950s (World Bank, 2017). The importance of these crises to this study is from the perspective 
of corporate behaviour in response to them. A number of studies (e.g., Mar-Malinero et al., 
2017; Omrane and Savaşer, 2017) have suggested changes in consumer and corporate 
behaviour as important factors to consider after recessionary times. For instance, Japanese 
firms reduced their debts for fear of deflation, which could affect their debt repayments 
(Nakaso 2001). Although Japanese firms were impacted by the 1997-1998 Asian financ ia l 
crisis, the 2007-2008 has been by far their worst recession (OECD, 2013). Indeed, our paper 
differs from previous studies, such as those of Harris and Raviv (1991) and Chevalier (1995), 
as we focus solely on Japanese firms, which enjoy the unique ‘Keiretsu’-style industria l 
characteristics. Thus, to the best of our knowledge, our study is the first to examine how crisis 
indicators interact with competition in order to determine their impact on capital structure 
decisions of firms. 
 
Overall, our results provide support for the trade-off, pecking order and agency theories. Our 
findings suggest that firm-level factors that explain capital structure decisions of firms in 
market-based economies are also applicable in the context of Japan despite the unique 
characteristics of Japanese firms. More specifically, firm size, asset tangibility and volatility 
have statistically significant relationships with leverage. Conversely, profitability, liquidity and 
growth have negative statistical relationships with leverage. These relationships are in line with 
previous studies (e.g. Chen, 2004; Asad et al., 2019). This suggests that the industrial groupings 
(‘Keiretsu’), ownership structure and close business ties experienced by Japanese firms have 
no significant role in shaping the corporate financing decisions of firms investigated. Our 
empirical analysis also shows that, generally, the financial crisis affected various determinants 
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of capital structure in the context of Japan. Specifically, we observe that the crisis and its 
aftermath impacted on the tangibility–leverage relationship only in less competitive industr ies. 
This suggests that major banks do exercise caution regarding the threats of predation in less 
competitive industries, which compels them to condition lending on collateral. Additiona lly, 
in less competitive industries, our empirical analysis shows that firm size does not drive capital 
structure a period of financial crisis. 
 
Our paper contributes to the existing literature in several ways. First, this paper provides fresh 
evidence on the firm-level determinants of capital structure decisions of Japanese firms.  
Second, given the unique characteristics of Japanese firms, our paper provides evidence on the 
extent to which the recent global financial crisis affected the capital structure decisions of 
Japanese firms. Third, we assess the extent to which the effects of firm-level determinants of 
capital structure are moderated by the level of product market competition. Fourth, we forge 
ahead the adoption of price–cost margin (PCM), as a measure of firm-specific competition and 
then, we assess the extent to which the PCM drives various determinants of capital structure. 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 examines the relevant literature and its 
theoretical underpinnings. In Section 3, we discuss the sample, empirical design and 
measurement of key variables. Regression results are presented in Section 4 and, fina lly, 
Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Literature Review: Theory and Empirics 
2.1. Theoretical underpinnings   
Capital structure decisions remain one of the essential corporate decisions by executive 
managers of firms (Ahmed & Hla, 2019; Alexandridis & Hasan, 2019). This stems from the 
fact that from theoretical standpoints, a wrong capital structure decision can have profound 
implications for the cost of capital, riskiness and performance of a firm. Within the corporate 
finance literature, the irrelevance theory of Modigliani and Miller (1958, 1963) is often used 
as a theoretical basis for explaining the financing decision of firms. This theory advocates that 
no optimal capital structure exists and rates of return from using debt are offset by the risk 
incurred by using more debt. Following this, a review of the capital structure literature 
identifies various theories that that have been at the forefront of the debate on how various 
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firm-level characteristics affect firms’ debt-equity choice decisions (Frank & Shen, 2019; 
Grosse-Rueschkamp et al., 2019). For example, arising out of discussion of the irrelevance 
theory is the trade-off theory, which argues that an optimal capital structure is determined by 
the costs and benefits associated with the use of debt as against equity (Nicodano & Regis, 
2019; Ranasinghe, 2019). Thus, there is either an optimal debt-equity ratio, or a range for this 
ratio, whereby a firm’s average cost of capital can be minimised (Brown et al. 2019; Bartholdy, 
Mateus and Olson, 2015; Scott, 1977). 
In contrast, the development of Myers’ (1984) pecking order theory has led to the view that 
capital structure is driven by the existence of information asymmetry and the desire to reduce  
the transaction cost of finance. In the presence of information asymmetry, Myers (1984) 
observes a hierarchy in firms’ financing behaviour, whereby they first prefer to use interna l 
funds, followed by debt and finally equity. Thus, this theory suggests that more profitable firms 
will be less leveraged than less profitable ones. The agency theory (Chen et al., 2019; Dakua, 
2019; Jensen and Mackling, 1976), however, argues that capital structure is driven by conflic ts 
of interest between shareholders and managers, whereby leverage is used as a disciplining 
device.   
 
2.2. Empirical literature review and hypotheses development 
2.2.1 Firm-level determinants of capital structure 
Despite their differences, the afore-mentioned theoretical positions have received significant 
empirical support, suggesting that various firm-level factors can drive firm financing decisions 
in both local and international business contexts (Inderst & Vladimirov, 2019; Ji et al., 2019; 
Lemmon & Zender, 2019; Nicodano & Regis, 2019; Ranasinghe, 2019; Wang et al., 2019). 
These factors include firm size, profitability, asset tangibility, non-debt tax shield, liquid ity, 
volatility and growth (Antill & Grenadier, 2019; Asad et al., 2019). To start with, theoretica l 
arguments on capital structure suggest that a firm’s size affects its debt–equity decision. 
Arguments put forth by the trade-off theory suggest that large firms are more diversified and 
thus, tend to have less volatile earnings and less bankruptcy risk (Ji et al., 2019; Lemmon & 
Zender, 2019). Chen (2004) noted that, large firms may be able to reduce transaction cost  
during the issuance of long-term debt. Thus, firm size should be positively related to leverage. 
Degryse et al. (2010) noted that larger firms tend to engage the services of more financial and 
8 
 
administrative staff, and therefore become more knowledgeable about better financ ing 
methods. This results in an improved bargaining power with lenders; hence, a positive size–
leverage relationship is expected. The above theoretical argument is in line with that of agency 
theory (Jensen, 1986) that suggests that large firms are more likely to use long-term debt as a 
disciplining device. In keeping with these theoretical arguments, various studies (e.g., Agyei-
Boapeah, 2015; Paligorova & Xu, 2012; Kayo and Kimura, 2011; De Jong, 2008) have 
documented a positive relationship between firm size and leverage. However, the pecking order 
theory observes that larger firms have lower asymmetric information between insiders within 
a firm and the capital market. These attributes permit them to issue informationally sensitive 
securities like equity. Therefore, one can expect larger firms to have lower leverage, as has 
been observed empirically in the literature (e.g., Danso and Adomko, 2014; Titman and 
Wessel, 1998; Wang et al., 2019).  
On profitability, the asymmetry of information as observed in the pecking order theory of 
Myers and Majluf (1984) also suggests that firms prefer internal to external finance. Hence, 
profitable firms are expected to have lower leverage in their capital structure. Various empirica l 
evidence (e.g., Agyei-Boapeah, 2015; Hall et al., 2004; Fama and French, 2002; Frank & Shen, 
2019) offers support for this by showing a negative relationship between profitability and 
leverage. Within the logic of the trade-off theory, however, profitable firms should borrow 
more to take advantage of tax shield of debt. Indeed, this tax-effect argument also finds support 
in the international context (e.g., Asad et al., 2019; Chen et al., 2019; De Jong, 2008). Thus, in 
this respect, the profitability–leverage relationship remains empirical issue to be investigated.   
In the case of asset tangibility, both trade-off and pecking order theories offer support for a 
positive tangibility–leverage relationship. Their argument emanates from the fact that tangib le 
assets serve as collateral for securing loans, as they have a reduced asset specificity, from the 
perspective of transaction cost economics (Ahmed & Hla, 2019; Myers, 1977). There is a great 
deal of empirical evidence that supports this argument. For instance, Kayo and Kimura (2011) 
noted that, in countries with less developed bond markets, collateral offered by fixed assets is 
more important to increase leverage. Other empirical extensions (e.g., Kieschnick & 
Moussawi, 2018; Paligorova & Xu, 2012; De Jong et al., 2008; Chen, 2004) have also found a 
positive relationship between asset tangibility and leverage.  
In relation to non-debt tax shield (NDTS), both the pecking order and the trade-off theories 
suggest a negative NDTS–leverage relationship. This argument stems from the fact that a larger 
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NDTS should lead to a reduction in the amount of taxable income. For instance, Fama and 
French (2002) observe a negative relationship between leverage and NDTS. Likewise, in 
DeAngelo and Masulis (1980), NDTS is treated as an interest expense and thus, deducted in 
the calculation of corporate tax. Hence, a greater NDTS should lead to lower leverage (Antill 
& Grenadier, 2019; Paligorova & Xu, 2012). 
Further, the theoretical argument on the liquidity–leverage relationship is mixed within the 
finance literature. According to the trade-off theory, liquidity should be positively related to 
leverage. Firms with higher levels of liquidity are able to meet their debt obligations on time 
and improve their credit rating (Nicodano & Regis, 2019; Ozkan, 2001). Hence, liquid ity 
reduces the threat of default and offers firms the opportunity to leverage up. The pecking order 
theory, in turn, states a negative relationship between liquidity and leverage. This explanation 
is based on the suggestion that firms with greater liquid assets may use less debt to protect the 
interests of shareholders against those of debtholders. Accordingly, Prowse (1990) points out 
that a firm’s level of liquidity shows the extent to which shareholders can manipulate their 
assets at the expense of bondholders. In an international context, De Jong et al. (2008) examine 
the capital structure decisions of firms and provide evidence that liquidity is both positive ly 
and negatively related to leverage.   
Of the empirical studies that evaluate the relationship between firm-level factors and leverage, 
the majority find evidence that earnings volatility (a proxy for firm risk) and leverage are 
negatively related (e.g., De Jong, 2008; Chen, 2004; Ranasinghe, 2019). This relationship is 
based on the logic that firms with volatile earnings have a greater risk of default, which impacts 
negatively on their ability to secure external finance or makes external financing costly (De 
Angelo and Masulis, 1980; Ji et al., 2019). Other studies have also shown a positive relationship 
between earnings volatility and leverage (e.g., Grosse-Rueschkamp et al., 2019; Michaelas et 
al., 1999). A plausible explanation for this is that earnings volatility may drive firms into 
acquiring additional debt with the purpose of achieving long-term earnings stability. Thus, the 
overall effect of volatility on capital structure remains empirical issue that is open to further 
investigation and depends on the balance between the supply-side and the demand-side effects. 
Finally, the relationship between growth opportunities and leverage remains an empirica l 
question in the finance literature. In terms of the pecking order hypothesis of Myers and Majluf 
(1984), high growth opportunity firms have a greater level of information asymmetry. Thus, 
one can expect higher growth firms to be more leveraged since debt is less sensitive to adverse 
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selection cost (e.g., see Chen, 2004; Lemmon & Zender, 2019; Ozkan, 2001). However, both 
the trade-off and agency theories predict a negative relationship. In the view of the trade-off 
theory, growth opportunities that are in the form of intangible assets cannot be collateralised. 
Thus, firms with growth opportunities tend to borrow less and use more equity (Alexandrid is 
& Hasan, 2019; Céspedes et al., 2010; Chen, 2004). 
The foregoing discussions have established potential relationships between firm-level factors 
and leverage, as postulated by various theories and summarised in Table 1. We emphasise, 
however, that given the unique (e.g., ‘Keiretsu’) characteristics of Japanese firms, these firms 
could attach less relevance to the hypothesised relationships between firm-level factors and 
leverage. For instance, the close lending relationship between the majority of Japanese firms 
and larger multinational banks could make information less asymmetric, thus questioning the 
logic of the pecking order and agency theories. Likewise, shareholdings by large major banks 
and belongingness to major industrial groups could minimise the threat of bankruptcy costs. In 
the light of the above argument, we state our first hypothesis as; 
H1: The relationship between firm-level characteristics and capital structure of Japanese firms 
is less significant. 
[Table 1 about here] 
2.2.2. Financial crisis and capital structure  
The 2007-2008 global economic recession intensified interest in investigating the effects of 
financial crisis on financing decisions of firms (e.g., Alexandridis & Hasan, 2019; Demirguc-
Kunt et al., 2020; Crotty, 2009). Indeed, our interest in the effect of crisis on capital structure 
of Japanese firms is linked to the theoretical suggestions that the increased uncertainties and 
risk coupled with decline in returns would make lenders unwilling to commit to long term 
investments (Dick et al., 2013; Lemmon & Zender, 2019). This is because financial crises are 
characterised by higher likelihood of defaults, which increases risks and the commensura te 
interest on credit (Frank & Shen, 2019; Gürkaynak and Wright, 2012). Theoretically, the 
uncertainty associated with financial crisis could affect long-term leverage from the 
perspectives of both firms and lenders. A rise in uncertainty makes business prospects oscillate 
in such a way that firms forgo projects with long-term maturity so as to reduce their leverage 
levels (Alexandridis & Hasan, 2019; Antill & Grenadier, 2019; Brunnermeier and Oehmke, 
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2013). That is, the preference for flexibility in finance options associated with vola tile 
economic conditions makes short-term leverage preferable. Similarly, higher bankruptcy risk 
means that lenders are unwilling to fund long term investments in jurisdictions with high 
monitoring and bankruptcy costs and where enforcement of contracts are strenuous (see 
Diamond, 2004; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Nicodano & Regis, 2019). 
Demirguc-Kunt et al., (2020) recently uncovered that firm leverage in general, long- term 
leverage and debt maturity, all declined during and immediately after the global financial crisis 
in both developed and developing economies. These findings were particularly pronounced for 
countries with less efficient legal and information sharing systems, as well as countries with 
tougher restrictions on bank entry. Thus, their findings suggest that firms use less long- term 
leverage, more short-term leverage and may resort to capital markets during or immediate ly 
after a global financial crisis. Given the unique (Keiretsu) characteristics of Japanese firms, it 
would be interesting to examine whether the close association of firms to lenders make a 
significant change to financing decisions during a financial crisis. On this basis, we proceed 
with our next the hypothesis as:  
H2: The 2007-2008 financial crisis is less likely to have a significant impact on the relationship 
between the firm-level determinants and leverage of Japanese firms. 
 
2.2.3. Product market competition and capital structure 
Previous studies (e.g., Dakua, 2019; Elmagrhi et al., 2018; Frank & Shen, 2019; Valta, 2012; 
Guney et al., 2011; Showalter, 1999) suggest the possible relationships between a firm’s 
product market competition and capital structure. Generally, firms use a level of debt 
commensurate with the level of competition. Theoretically, the direction of the relationship 
remains a controversy. While the limited liability approach assumes that equity maximis ing 
firms employ debt to affect competition (a positive relationship), the predation model assumes 
the use of less debt (a negative relationship) to avoid predation from low geared competitors 
(see Liu et al. 2002; Rathinasamy et al., 2000; Barclay and Smith, 1996; Inderst & Vladimirov, 
2019; Ji et al., 2019). Empirical studies (e.g., Cerasi et al., 2017) found that firms in product 
markets with higher competition employ higher levels of leverage. This is the case especially 
when there are competitors within the local market who could take over firms with weak 
performance (Cerasi et al., 2017). Similarly, Fosu (2013) also found a significant positive 
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relationship between capital structure and product market competition in South African firms. 
That is, higher competition induces the employment of higher debt levels for varied reasons. 
These include the risk of competitors winning the market share or acquiring weaker firms 
(Cerasi et al., 2017; Liu et al., 2002; Lemmon & Zender, 2019; Nicodano & Regis, 2019). 
Indeed, our interest in product market competition in Japan stems from the possibility that 
unique industry factors could drive the product market competition and leverage relationship. 
For example, factors, such as the pricing of financial products relative to product market 
competition (see Valta, 2012) may stifle leverage levels or firm-lender relations (‘Keiretsu’) 
may ease pricing and access to leverage. On this basis, we state that; 
H3: Product market competition significantly impacts the observed relation between firm-level 
determinants and leverage. 
 
3. Data and empirical methodology  
3.1. Data description 
We obtain annual financial data for Japanese firms from the DataStream database for the period 
1995-2013. The selection of the firms was guided by the availability of data. We started with 
4,482 firms. However, we dropped firms and years with missing key variables from our dataset, 
resulting in an unbalanced panel data comprising 4,284 firms and 61,000 firm-year 
observations.  
3.2. Measurements of variables 
The measures used in this study were chosen in line with the earlier discussed empirical and 
theoretical literature. This enabled us compare our results with prior research. Following the 
extant literature (e.g., Fosu et al., 2016; Huyghebaert & Xu, 2016; Dudley, 2012), we 
winsorised all variables at a 5% level on either tail to mitigate the effect of outliers. Variables 
used are summarised in Table 2. 
 
[Table 2 about here] 
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3.3. Descriptive statistics and correlations 
In Table 3, we present the summary statistics of the variables used in this study over the whole 
sample period. The sample shows considerable variance for all variables. A few findings are 
worth noting. The average value of our main measure of leverage – book leverage (BLev) is 
0.23. This low figure may reflect the fact that Japanese firms are mainly equity financed. The 
average value of long-term leverage is 0.10. This shows that a greater portion of the capital 
structure of most of the firms studied is short-term debt, as noted in Kester (1986). Firm size 
has a mean value of 17.22 and a standard deviation of 1.46. This shows that there are low levels 
of variability among the firms examined. The minimum and maximum values of these variables 
are 14.72 and 20.17, respectively, suggesting a low degree of heterogeneity across firms. There 
is further evidence that Japanese firms tend to be highly liquid with a mean value of 1.82. This 
variable also exhibits a low level of variability with a standard deviation of 1.12. Moving 
beyond this, we investigate whether the independent variables employed are likely to suffer 
from collinearity problems. We first note that the correlation (but not necessarily causal 
relationship) between our dependent variables (BLev and LTlev) is very high. This suggests 
that both variables are capturing a similar aspect. With regards to the independent variables, 
the correlation among them (as presented in Table 4) reveals there is no multicollinearity issue. 
We further probe the relationship between our independent variables and leverage by plotting 
detrended leverage against the firm-level variables. As shown in Figure 1, the line graphs 
support the correlation presented in Table 4.  
 
 [Table 3 about here] 
 
[Table 4 about here] 
 
[Figure 1 about here] 
 
 
14 
 
3.4. Estimation method 
Following on from section 2, we show theoretically that firm capital structure is conditioned 
on firm-level factors of size (SZ), profit (PR), asset tangibility (TAN), non-debt tax shield 
(NDTS), liquidity (LIQ), volatility (VOL) and growth opportunities (GR). Hence, in this section, 
we formulate the following baseline regression empirical model to test the predicted 
relationships: 
 
  B 1,1,,   tititti XLev                             (1) 
Where BLev is our measure of overall leverage (defined as the ratio of total debt to total assets), 
X is the matrix of the firm-level factors previously referenced and defined in Table 1, and  is 
a composite error term, including time-invariant firm-fixed effects and an independently and 
identically distributed component with mean zero: 
11,   titi                                                                                                               (2) 
For robustness tests, we modify our baseline model by replacing overall leverage with long-
term leverage (LTLev), a relatively stable component of leverage. We then obtain our second 
model as follows:    
1,1,,   tititti XLTLev                                            (3) 
To control for the effect of the recent global financial crisis and industry competition, we 
estimate Eq. (1) and Eq. (2) for the full sample and separate sub-samples of pre-crisis, crisis 
and post-crisis periods, as well as for high-competition and low-competition sub-samples.  We 
also interact crisis indicators with competition. To this end, we follow the competition literature 
(e.g., Haw et al., 2015; Fosu, 2013; Valta, 2012; Datta et al., 2011; Guney et al. 2011) and 
proxy industry competition with price-cost margin (PCM). The PCM captures the extent to 
which firms can exercise higher pricing power in the product market; hence, it is used as an 
inverse measure of competition in product markets. We follow Haw et al. (2015) and compute 
our PCM as follows: 
                PCM = 
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠−𝐶𝑂𝐺𝑆−𝑆𝐺&𝐴
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠
                                                                                            (4) 
Where COGS is cost of goods sold and SG&A is sales, general and administrative expenses.  
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We did not estimate our models, Eq. (1) and Eq. (2), using OLS, because this estimation 
approach fails to control for unobserved firm-level heterogeneity, leading to biased and 
inconsistent estimates (Wooldridge, 2009). Hence, a practical approach is to adopt a panel 
fixed-effect or random-effect estimation method. We confirm, using the Hausman test, that the 
fixed-effect models are most appropriate to account for the firm-level heterogeneity. Therefore, 
we base our analysis on the panel fixed-effect models and use the pooled OLS models for 
robustness checks. 
To control for possible heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation within firms, standard errors of 
our regression coefficients are adjusted using Huber-White approach and clustering at the firm 
level. Finally, following the extant literature (e.g., Elmagrhi et al., 2018; Mc Namara, et al., 
2017; Bonaimé et al., 2014; Danso & Adomako, 2014; Zou & Xiao, 2006), we lag the 
explanatory variables by one period to isolate the analysis from the potential reverse causality 
between our independent and dependent variables. The next section presents our estimated 
results. 
 
4. Results and discussion 
4.1. Firm-level determinants of capital structure across the entire sample period 
Our baseline results are presented in Table 5. Two main estimation methods are employed. The 
Hausman specification test performed provided support for the fixed-effect estimation and 
therefore we discuss our results using the fixed-effect model estimations. The interpretation of 
the results are based on our main measure of leverage (i.e., BLev) while MLev is used for 
robustness check.  
Therefore, from Model 2, we observe that firm size (SZ) and leverage (BLev) are positively and 
significantly related at the 1% level (β = 0.063). This is consistent with the prediction of the 
trade-off theory. Intuitively, larger Japanese firms, which could be more diversified and have 
lower bankruptcy risk, pay less risk premium. Our findings are consistent with prior studies 
(e.g., Frank & Shen, 2019; Grosse-Rueschkamp et al., 2019; Pan et al., 2015; Chen, 2004; 
Ozkan, 2001) that find a positive relationship between firm size and leverage.  
On the relationship between profitability and leverage, we find that profitability (PR) is 
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negatively related to leverage (BLev) of Japanese firms. This is consistent with the pecking 
order theory that prefers internal to external finance (see also: Boapeah, 2015; Danso & 
Adomako, 2014; Hall et al., 2004; Ozkan, 2001).  
 
[Table 5 about here] 
 
We also observed that tangibility (TAN) and leverage (BLev) are positively and significantly 
related at the 1% level. This underscores the importance of asset base as an added security in 
reducing a lender’s risk (Nicodano & Regis, 2019; Ranasinghe, 2019; Danso & Adomako, 
2014; De Jong et al., 2008; Williamson, 1988). This tends to support both the pecking order 
and the trade-off theories. In addition, non-debt tax shield (NDTS) and leverage (LEV) are 
negatively related. This is in line with other empirical studies (e.g., Asad et al., 2019; Chen et 
al., 2019; Chen, 2004; Fama and French, 2002; Ozkan, 2001) and supports the logic of both 
the trade-off and pecking order hypotheses. 
 
Liquidity (LIQ) and leverage (BLev) are negatively and significantly related at the 1% level. 
This contrasts with the expectation of the trade-off theory that predicts a positive relationship 
between liquidity and leverage. As noted by Prowse (1990), firm managers could manipula te 
liquid assets in favour of shareholders, as against debt holders; hence, the negative liquidity-
leverage relationship. Our result supports other studies (e.g., Danso & Adomako, 2014; Harris 
& Roark, 2019; Inderst & Vladimirov, 2019; Ozkan, 2001).  
   
The estimated coefficient of earnings volatility (VOL) has a positive sign and is statistica l ly 
significant at the 10% level. This outcome is in line with the trade-off theory and consistent 
with prior studies (e.g., Kieschnick & Moussawi, 2018; Danso & Adomako, 2014; De Jong et 
al., 2008; Hall et al., 1999). This suggests that the demand-side effect on the capital structure 
of volatility outweighs the supply-side effects. This is not surprising for Japanese firms because 
of the special relationship between these firms and their banks.  
 
The relationship between growth (GR) and leverage is found to be negative and significant at 
5%. This is consistent with the argument that a greater growth opportunity leads to flexibi lity 
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to engage in suboptimal investment and therefore expropriate wealth from debtholders to 
shareholders in the form of asset substitution effect (Wang et al., 2019; Chen, 2004; Ozkan, 
2001). Our result is in line with the argument of the agency theory. Impliedly, high-growth 
Japanese firms will still be viewed with an elevated level of scepticism by debt providers, 
despite their strong relationships with major banks. Also, the results from Model 4 (i.e. MLev) 
confirm the results from Model 2. This suggests that our results are robust to alternat ive 
definition of leverage.   
 
The next set of regressions in Models 5 and 6 of Table 5 investigate the relationship between 
firm-level factors and long-term leverage (LTLev). Based on Model 6, Evidence obtained 
indicates that firm size (SZ), asset tangibility (TAN) and growth (GR) are all positively and 
significantly related to long-term leverage at the 1% level (see also Chen, 2004). We also 
observe that profitability (PR) shows a negative and significant relationship with long- term 
leverage at the 1% level. In this case, the prediction of the pecking order theory prevails as an 
explanation for the lower level of debt at the most profitable companies (Ji et al., 2019; 
Lemmon & Zender, 2019; Kayo and Kimura, 2011). The relationship between long- term 
leverage and non-debt tax shield, although negative, remains insignificant. The relationship 
between liquidity and long-term leverage produces a negative value. But this result is only 
significant at 10%. We also observe a positive but insignificant relationship between earnings 
volatility (VOL) and long-term leverage. In effect, our results are consistent with those of 
Models 2 and 4. This stems from the fact that LTLev is the most stable component of overall 
leverage. In sum, contrary to our prediction (i.e., H1), we observe that firm-level factors that 
explain capital structure decisions of firms in market-based economies are also applicable in 
the context of Japan despite the unique characteristics of Japanese firms. 
 
 
4.2. Firm-level determinants of capital structure: the role of the crisis 
So far, we have shown the role of the various firm-level determinants of capital structure. In 
this sub-section, we investigate whether the 2007-2008 financial crisis impacted the traditiona l 
determinants of the capital structure decisions of Japanese firms. To do this, we split our data 
into three sample periods (i.e., pre-crisis, crisis and post crisis) and re-estimate the regression 
models using our two dependent variables. We present the results in Table 6.   
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[Table 6 about here]  
 
We find that, generally, most of the variables examined seem to have been affected by the 
recent global financial crisis. However, the contributions of size (SZ) and profitability (PR) 
appear not to have been substantially affected by the financial crisis as their relationship and 
statistical significance remain similar across the three sample periods. For instance, the 
coefficient on size remains positive across all sub-samples. Additionally, the coefficients 
remain statistically significant for all models.  
On profitability, we observe that the coefficient remains negative and statistically significant 
across all models. It is, however, worth noting that the absolute size of the coefficient on 
profitability is smaller, relative to the pre-crisis period, for both measures of leverage during 
crisis and – to a lesser extent – in the post-crisis period. This means that profitability (PR) is 
less important to Japanese firms’ capital structure decisions during the crisis period. This lower 
sensitivity of leverage to profitability can be reasonably attributed to the significant support 
provided by the large affiliated and owner banks.  
The effect of asset tangibility on leverage remains consistently positive for both overall and 
long-term leverage across all sub-samples. The magnitude of these effects is larger during the 
crisis and post-crisis periods. Further, the role of TAN in the pre-crisis period is only significant 
at the 10% level, but the same effect is significant at the 1% level in the crisis and post-crisis 
periods. Overall, these findings suggest that the financial crisis and its aftermath imposed some 
level of financial constraints on Japanese firms, despite the close-knit relationship between 
these firms and their banks. Thus, TAN remains an important determinant of capital structure, 
especially during crisis and post-crisis periods (see Almeida and Campello, 2007). The findings 
suggest, unsurprisingly, that the significance of the effect of asset tangibility (TAN) on overall 
leverage and long-term leverage seems to be driven by the crisis.  
We note that the effect of non-debt tax shield (NDTS) is largely insignificant except for the 
effect on long-term leverage during the post-crisis period. The effect on overall leverage loses 
its statistical significance across all sub-samples, whilst the effect on long-term leverage gains 
significance (at the 5% level) during the post-crisis period. These findings suggest that the post-
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crisis experience discourages long-term borrowing where the benefit of the tax shield is 
minimal. Hence, the effect of NDTS on overall leverage is driven by the post-crisis experience. 
With respect to liquidity (LIQ), its effect on overall leverage remains consistently negative 
across all sub-samples. However, the effect is statistically significant (at the 1% level) for only 
the pre- and post-crisis periods. The effect on long-term debt is, however, mixed; although 
negative for the post-crisis sample, it is positive for the pre-crisis period but statistica l ly 
significant only at the 10% level. Thus, the evidence suggests that liquidity reduces the leverage 
levels in periods prior to crisis and after crisis; however, the observed relationship prior to crisis 
appears to be driven mainly by short-term variations in debt levels. It further suggests, contrary 
to the pecking order theory, that the global financial crisis makes liquidity irrelevant in capital 
structure decisions. Perhaps, liquidity crisis associated with crisis increases the marginal value 
of liquidity to the extent that firms become more inclined to buffer their levels by either 
maintaining their debt levels or reducing their debt levels only marginally in response to any 
increase in liquidity.  
We also observe that, in almost all the sub-sample periods, the effect of volatility (VOL) is 
negative, but statistically insignificant during the pre-crisis and the crisis periods. This finding 
can be attributed to the close-knit relationship between Japanese firms and major banks within 
the country. However, there is a little, albeit weak, evidence in the post-crisis period that 
volatility impacts negatively on overall leverage, consistent with the predictions of the agency 
theory and the evidence in Titman and Wessels (1988). 
The relationship between growth (GR) and leverage is largely negative across the three sample 
periods but only significant during the pre- and crisis periods. The coefficients on long- term 
leverage are significant during the crisis period only. Further, it is noteworthy that the 
coefficients of GR for the crisis period are about twice as high as those for the pre-crisis period. 
Hence, it can be concluded that growth opportunities negatively impact firms’ leverage, 
especially prior to and during crisis periods. This could be attributed to an attempt to minimise 
the agency cost of debt arising from the expropriation of the debtholder, which is highly likely 
during crisis.  
To conclude, contrary to our prediction (i.e., H2), we note some evidence suggesting that the 
traditional capital structure determinants show varied levels of sensitivity to financial crisis . 
On the one hand, we note that financial leverage is less sensitive to firm size and profitability 
20 
 
during financial crisis. On the other hand, we observe that the sensitivity of financial leverage 
to tangibility and growth is higher during financial crisis, compared to that observed in the pre-
crisis and post crisis periods. Within this spectrum, we find that financial leverage is insensit ive 
to non-debt tax shield, liquidity and volatility during financial crisis. Whilst these findings point 
to some mixed attributes of the special relationships amongst Japanese firms and between these 
firms and their major banks, they do suggest that affiliated Japanese banks help lessen the 
potential pressure associated with liquidity and volatility during financial crisis.  
 
4.3. Firm-level determinants of capital structure: the role of competition  
The previous section documents a substantial amount of variation in the various firm-leve l 
determinants of capital structure as a result of the 2007-2008 global financial crisis. Given that 
firm ownership structure and the lending relationship with major banks may shield Japanese 
firms from competitive pressure, we extend our baseline model and add a novel dimension by 
examining the moderating role of competition. The results of this are presented in Tables 7 and 
8. The findings in the first set of regressions (columns 1-2) in Table 7 document the role of 
competition on capital structure decision across all industries. In the second (columns 3-4) and 
the last (columns 5-6) sets of our regression analysis, we split our firms into high-competit ion 
and low-competition industries, respectively, to highlight the moderating role of competition 
on the traditional capital structure determinants. We split our firms into high- and low-
competition by using the median value (50th percentile) of the price-cost margin (PCM)4, where 
low-competition means PCM >50th percentile and high competition means PCM <50th 
percentile. 
First, the coefficient on price-cost margin (PCM) is negative and statistically significant at the 
1% level. This suggests that product market competition increases Japanese firms’ overall 
financial leverage and may enhance the benefits of leverage (Dakua, 2019; Elmagrhi et al., 
2018; Fosu 2013; Valta, 2012; Guney et al. 2011). This observation is consistent with the 
predatory theories of capital structure (see, Ahmed & Hla, 2019; Alexandridis & Hasan, 2019; 
Bolton and Scharfstein, 1990; Fudenberg and Tirole, 1986). It is also worth noting that, after 
controlling for the effect of competition, all of the other variables retain their signs. Further, 
                                                                 
4From Appendix 1, we test the robustness of our results by using HHI as an alternative measure of competition and our results 
are qualitatively similar to what is reported in Table 7. 
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except for growth (in column 1) and growth and liquidity (column 2), all the other variables 
retain their statistical significance. 
In the next sets of regressions, we find that the effect of firm size for overall leverage and long-
term leverage regressions is positive, statistically significant at the 1% level and qualitative ly 
similar to those reported for the full sample. The results suggest that, although product market 
competition marginally increases the impact of firm size on financial leverage, firm size 
remains relevant for capital structure decisions for firms in highly competitive industries as 
well as for those in industries with low levels of competition. 
Similarly, the coefficient on profitability remains negative and statistically significant for both 
overall leverage and long-term leverage across both high-competition and low-competit ion 
industries. However, it is apparent that competition moderates this effect, as the magnitude of 
the coefficients are smaller for the high competition sub-sample relative to those for the low 
competition sub-sample. These findings suggest that firms in highly competitive industries rely 
less on internal financing; thus, following a relatively less steep pecking order financing choice.  
Additionally, the coefficient of asset tangibility remains positive and statistically significant at 
the 1% level across sub-samples. This remains the case whether leverage is measured as overall 
leverage or as long-term leverage. The magnitude of the coefficient is also similar, suggesting 
no apparent evidence that competition plays an interactive role.  
Next, we find evidence that competition drives the relationship between non-debt tax shield 
and long-term leverage. The coefficient on non-deb tax shield is insignificant across all models 
apart from in column 6, where the dependent variable is long-term leverage. This observation 
is in line with both the trade-off and the pecking order theories, but, perhaps to a considerable 
extent, may be attributed to the firms’ attempt to balance the risk of predation with the potential 
benefits of the tax shield.  
Further, the effect of liquidity on leverage remains similar across both sub-samples of high and 
low competition, suggesting that competition does not significantly moderate the effect of 
liquidity on leverage. The effect on long-term leverage is, however, mixed as the coefficient in 
the high-competition sub-sample is positive, albeit at the 10% level. On volatility, we also note 
that the coefficient across both sub-samples is positive, although significant only for firms in 
industries with high competition. Thus, the volatility–leverage relationship appears to be driven 
by the levels of product market competition. 
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Moreover, the relationship between growth and leverage appears negative and insignificant , 
when we control for competition in the regression. In addition to this, the impact of growth 
across both high and low competitive industries should be noted. The coefficient of growth is 
negative and significant (at the 1% level) for highly competitive industries (in column 2), but 
insignificant for less competitive industries (column 5). However, the same coefficient is 
insignificant in column 3, but positive and significant in column 6. Thus, in relation to growth 
opportunities, the findings suggest that Japanese firms follow the pecking-order financ ing 
behaviour when industry competition is high, but a trade-off pattern when it is low. 
Our discussion so far suggests that industry- level competition interacts significantly with the 
traditional firm-level determinants of the capital structure of Japanese firms. Whilst there is no 
evidence that competition has a systematic moderating role on the effects of tangibility and 
liquidity on leverage, the evidence so far suggests that competition has a considerable impact 
on the relationship between the remaining firm-level factors and leverage.  
 
[Table 7 about here] 
 
4.4. Firm-level determinants of capital structure: The moderating role of competition and 
financial crisis  
The next set of results, presented in Table 8, focus on the joint role of competition and crisis 
on the relationship between firm-level factors and leverage. We do this to purge our results of 
any confounding effects of the interaction between competition and crisis, which could bias 
our results. 
 
[Table 8 about here] 
 
Table 8 presents the results of the joint role of competition and crisis on the relationship 
between firm-level factors and leverage. The estimated firm size (SZ) has a positive and 
significant relationship with leverage across all the sub-sample periods in highly competit ive 
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industries. We find similar results for the less competitive industries, with one exception, where 
the effect relating to the crisis period is insignificant. Thus, size does not drive the capital 
structure of Japanese firms in less competitive industries in a period of financial crisis. This 
observation could be attributed to the combined risk of predation and uncertainty. In addition, 
we observe that the coefficient of profitability (PR) is consistently negatively signed and 
statistically significant. Again, the coefficients are smaller in magnitude in highly competit ive 
industries for all sub-samples of crisis, pre- and post-crisis periods. This corroborates the earlier 
finding that suggested that competition moderates the effect of profitability on capital structure 
decisions. 
On asset tangibility (TAN) and non-debt tax shield (NDTS), we note the significant joint effect 
of competition and crisis. For firms in highly competitive industries, the effect of TAN is 
significant only in the pre-crisis period. In contrast, for firms in less competitive industries, the 
effect is significant for both crisis and post-crisis periods. Thus, the crisis and its aftermath 
impacted on the tangibility–leverage relationship only in low competitive industries. This 
suggests that the major banks do exercise some caution about the threats of predation in less 
competitive industries, which compels them to condition lending on collateral availability.  
Likewise, the coefficient of NDTS remains largely insignificant other than during financ ia l 
crisis in highly competitive industries. Moreover, the results do not show any significant 
moderating role of competition on the liquidity–leverage relationship. Further, the coefficients 
on volatility remain largely insignificant, except during the post-crisis period in less 
competitive industries: the post-crisis effect in less competitive industries turns negative, albeit 
at the 10% level. Yet again, the effect of growth remains largely negative and significant for 
highly competitive industries, but only during crisis. Finally, on the marginal effect of 
competition on leverage, the effect appears to be significant during the pre-crisis period only.  
The forgoing analyses suggest that the firm-level determinants of leverage are also relevant to 
Japanese firm. This notwithstanding, we highlight the significant joint interaction roles of 
competition and crisis. Controlling for the joint effects of competition and crisis, the evidence 
suggests a higher sensitivity of the size–leverage relationship jointly to competition and crisis. 
Additionally, we corroborate the accentuating effect of competition on the profit–leve rage 
relationship in crisis, pre- and post-crisis periods. Also, we show that the global crisis and its 
aftermath jointly with competition accentuate the sensitivity of leverage to asset tangibility. 
Finally, we examine the extent to which crisis and competition interact to impact on leverage. 
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We observe from Table 9 that the interaction between crisis and competition negatively impact 
on both BLev and LTLev. The results obtained generally provide support for our prediction (i.e. , 
H3). In general, the evidence obtained indicates that our results do not provide support for any 
specific theory of capital structure during crisis/non-crisis period or depending on the industry 
competition.  
 
[Table 9 about here] 
 
5. Conclusion 
  
In this paper, we empirically explore the role of firm-level factors in determining the capital 
structure decisions of Japanese firms. We also investigate how product market competition 
impact the observed relation between firm-level determinants and leverage and the extent to 
which these firm-level factors were influenced by the 2007-2008 global financial crisis. The 
unique characteristics of Japanese firms provide a strong motivation for this study. Our analys is 
offers support for existing evidence with respect to the role of firm-level factors in influenc ing 
financing decisions of firms. In general, the evidence obtained predominantly supports pecking 
order, trade-off and agency theories.  We also find persuasive evidence that the 2007-2008 
financial crisis affected almost all the firm-level determinants of capital structure.  
 
This study offers a number of implications. Theoretically, our findings extend the corporate 
finance literature in a number of ways. First, while previous studies (e.g., Antill & Grenadier, 
2019; Asad et al., 2019; Chen et al., 2019;  Danso and Adomako, 2014; Fosu, 2013; Muradoğlu 
& Sivaprasad, 2012) indicate that firm-level characteristics are important determinants of 
capital structure, theoretical specification, as well as empirical examination of how the level of 
product market competition drives the firm level–capital structure relationship remains 
underexplored. Thus, this study addresses this gap by relying on data from Japanese firms, a 
hitherto less examined sample for this purpose. In doing so, we add to a growing literature on 
capital structure decisions of firms (e.g., Dakua, 2019; Elmagrhi et al., 2018; Frank & Shen, 
2019; Grosse-Rueschkamp et al., 2019; Kieschnick & Moussawi, 2018; Agyei-Boapeah, 2015; 
Paligorova & Xu, 2012). Second, we demonstrate the impact of the 2007-2008 financial crisis 
on the capital structure decisions of firms, showing that Japanese firms were not isolated from 
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the impacts of the 2007-2008 financial crisis.   
Our study also stresses the importance of product market competition in the capital structure 
decisions of firms in finance research. Thus, in a competitive environment, firm-leve l 
characteristics significantly influence the financing behaviour of firms. In other words, firm-
level characteristics are extremely important, particularly for firms that operate in a competit ive 
environment. Overall, our contextual research findings helps to extend the theoretical and 
practical understanding relating to the capital structure decisions of firms. Despite our 
contributions, as we have concentrated on a single country (Japan), future studies should seek 
to extend the current research to countries with similar unique characteristics, in order to 
provide further insights into financing decisions of firms.  
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Table 1: Firm-level factors and leverage 
Variable Predicted Sign Theory Empirical 
Evidence 
 
Firm Size 
+ Trade-off Barton et al. (1989) 
─ Pecking order Titman and Wessel 
(1988) 
 
Profitability 
+ Trade-off De Jong et al. 
(2008) 
─ Pecking order 
theory 
Dudley (2012) 
 
Asset Tangibility 
 
+ 
Trade-off  
pecking order 
 
Dudley (2012). 
 
Non-debt tax shield 
 
- 
Trade-off  
 pecking order 
Danso and 
Adomako (2014) 
 
Liquidity  
+ Trade-off De Jong et al. 
(2008) 
 
─ 
 
Pecking order 
 
Ozkan, (2001) 
 
Earnings Volatility 
       
               + 
 
Trade-off 
 
De Jong et al. 
(2008)) 
               ─ Agency Titman and Wessels 
(1988); 
 
Growth 
+ Pecking order Ozkan, (2001) 
─ Agency   
Trade-off 
De Jong et al. (2008) 
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Table 2: Summary of variables 
Variable Measurement Literature 
 
 
Book Leverage (BLev) 
Book leverage and Market 
leverage are analogously 
defined, except that cash 
holdings are not subtracted in the 
numerator (i.e. cash holdings are 
not subtracted from total debt). 
 
 
 
Verwijmeren & Derwall, (2010). 
 
Market Leverage (MLev) 
Cash holdings are not 
subtracted from the 
numerator - total debt. 
 
Verwijmeren & Derwall, (2010). 
 
Long-Term Leverage (LTLev) 
Ratio of long-term debt to total 
assets 
 
Chen (2004) 
 
Size (SZ) 
 
Log of total assets 
García-Sánchez & Noguera-
Gámez, (2017); Ma, (2014); 
Chen et al., (2014); Faccio, 
(2010); Chen (2004);Tan et al.,  
(2001); Tian and Lau (2001). 
 
Profitability (PR) 
Ratio of operating income to 
total assets 
  
Kayo & Kimura (2011) 
 
Tangibility (TAN) 
Ratio of fixed assets to total 
assets 
 
Chen (2004); Kayo & Kimura 
(2011) 
 
Non-debt tax shield (NDTS) 
Ratio of depreciation expense to 
total assets 
 
Danso & Adomako (2014) 
 
Liquidity (LIQ) 
Ratio of current assets to current 
liabilities 
 
De Jong et al. (2008) 
 
Volatility (VOL) 
Ratio of standard deviation of 
operating income to total assets 
 
De Jong et al. (2008) 
 
Growth (GR) 
The one-year growth rate of 
sales 
 
Fosu et al. (2016); Fosu, (2013) 
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics 
         
 Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 25th % 50th % 75th% Obs. 
BLev 0.23 0.19 0.00 0.60 0.05 0.20 0.37 61,178 
MLev 0.18 0.14 0.00 3.44 0.08 0.14 0.24 57,876 
LTLev 0.10 0.10 0.00 0.33 0.01 0.07 0.16 61,147 
SZ 17.22 1.46 14.72 20.17 16.17 17.11 18.17 61,343 
PR 0.04 0.05 -0.08 0.15 0.02 0.04 0.07 59,665 
TAN 0.29 0.17 0.02 0.63 0.16 0.28 0.41 61,207 
NDTS 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.08 0.01 0.03 0.04 59,276 
LIQ 1.82 1.12 0.60 4.91 1.06 1.46 2.20 60,798 
VOL 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.08 0.01 0.01 0.03 52,130 
GR 0.03 0.13 -0.20 0.34 -0.05 0.02 0.09 56,883 
This table presents the descriptive statistics for the data. The sample comprises Japanese 4,284 firms over the period 1995 
to 2013. The variable descriptions are provided in Table 2 above. 
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Table 4: Correlations matrix 
           
 BLev MLev LTLev SZ PR TAN NDTS LIQ VOL GR 
BLev 1.00          
           
MLev 0.40* 1.00         
           
LTLev 0.80* 0.29* 1.00        
           
SZ 0.13* 0.32* 0.19* 1.00       
           
PR -0.30* -0.22* -0.17* -0.01* 1.00      
           
TAN 0.36* 0.47* 0.43* 0.18* -0.10* 1.00     
           
NDTS 0.14* 0.16* 0.22* 0.10* -0.03* 0.42* 1.00    
           
LIQ -0.58* -0.59* -0.41* -0.19* 0.19* -0.38* -0.14* 1.00   
           
VOL -0.05* -0.30* -0.06* -0.35* -0.10* -0.22* 0.11* 0.20* 1.00  
           
GR -0.07* -0.10* -0.01 -0.05* 0.40* -0.11* -0.01* 0.01* 0.03* 1.00 
This table presents the correlation matrix for the data. The sample and variable definitions are as described in 
Table 2. * indicates significance at 1% or better  
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Table 5: Regression results for the full sample period – dependent variable: Overall 
Leverage & Long-term Leverage  
 Book Leverage (BLev)  Market Leverage (MLev)  Long-Term Leverage (LTLev) 
 OLS  FE  OLS  FE  OLS FE 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
SZ 0.001 0.063***  0.014*** 0.013***  0.008*** 0.031*** 
 (0.002) (0.004)  (0.001) (0.003)  (0.001) (0.003) 
         
PR -0.648*** -0.466***  -0.274*** -0.050***  -0.208*** -0.155*** 
 (0.025) (0.017)  (0.024) (0.013)  (0.014) (0.010) 
         
TAN 0.204*** 0.071***  0.199*** 0.189***  0.177*** 0.097*** 
 (0.014) (0.018)  (0.008) (0.012)  (0.008) (0.012) 
         
NDTS -0.172* -0.158**  -0.118** 0.088  0.180*** -0.043 
 (0.102) (0.076)  (0.058) (0.062)  (0.060) (0.050) 
         
LIQ -0.082*** -0.036***  -0.055*** -0.034***  -0.025*** -0.002* 
 (0.002) (0.002)  (0.002) (0.002)  (0.001) (0.001) 
         
VOL 0.946*** 0.078*  -0.762*** -0.136***  0.433*** 0.018 
 (0.075) (0.042)  (0.061) (0.036)  (0.044) (0.028) 
         
GR 0.046*** -0.009**  -0.012* 0.025***  0.061*** 0.011*** 
 (0.008) (0.004)  (0.007) (0.004)  (0.005) (0.003) 
         
_cons 0.333*** -0.831***  -0.365*** -0.408***  -0.038** -0.462*** 
 (0.027) (0.066)  (0.018) (0.048)  (0.016) (0.046) 
N 45648 45648  42548 42548  45624 45624 
r2 0.413 0.257  0.474 0.143  0.285 0.084 
N_clust 4268.000 4268.000  4222.000 4222.000  4268.000 4268.000 
This table presents the OLS and FE estimation results for the overall leverage and Long-term leverage 
determinants. Standard errors robust to heteroscedasticity and clustering within firm are given in parentheses. 
The sample and variable definitions are as described in Table 2. 
⁎ Indicates significance at 10%.; ⁎⁎ Indicates significance at 5%.; ⁎⁎⁎ Indicates significance at 1%. 
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Table 6: Regression results for the firm-level determinants of capital structure: The role of the 
financial crisis 
  Pre-crisis   Crisis   Post crisis  
  BLev LTLev  BLev LTLev  BLev LTLev 
  (1) (2)  (3) (4)   (5) (6) 
SZ   0.063*** 0.025***  0.044*** 0.036***   0.059*** 0.028*** 
  (0.006) (0.004)  (0.012) (0.008)  (0.009) (0.005) 
          
PR   -0.366*** -0.140***  -0.126*** -0.037*  -0.176*** -0.052*** 
  (0.022) (0.014)  (0.029) (0.020)  (0.024) (0.016) 
          
TAN   0.038* 0.062***  0.125*** 0.086***  0.092*** 0.073*** 
  (0.022) (0.014)  (0.045) (0.027)  (0.025) (0.019) 
          
NDTS   -0.027 -0.010  0.203 0.045  -0.130 -0.199** 
  (0.094) (0.062)  (0.180) (0.114)  (0.108) (0.088) 
          
LIQ   -0.020*** 0.003*  -0.005 -0.003  -0.011*** -0.003* 
  (0.003) (0.002)  (0.003) (0.003)  (0.003) (0.002) 
          
VOL   -0.048 -0.046  0.067 -0.049  -0.092* -0.028 
  (0.064) (0.041)  (0.093) (0.063)  (0.051) (0.037) 
          
GR   -0.012** 0.005  -0.023*** -0.013**  -0.004 -0.004 
  (0.006) (0.004)  (0.008) (0.006)  (0.006) (0.004) 
          
_cons  -0.789*** -0.347***  -0.564*** -0.552***  -0.803*** -0.404*** 
  (0.102) (0.067)  (0.207) (0.139)  (0.153) (0.085) 
N  23406 23404  9775 9772  12467 12448 
r2  0.215 0.071  0.114 0.051  0.075 0.026 
N_clust  3692.000 3692.000  3511.000 3511.000  3426.000 3425.000 
This table presents the FE estimation results for the entire sample period. Standard errors robust to 
heteroscedasticity and clustering within firm are given in parentheses.  
The sample and variable definitions are as described in Table 2. 
⁎ Indicates significance at 10%; ⁎⁎ Indicates significance at 5%; ⁎⁎⁎ Indicates significance at 1%.   
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Table 7: Regression results for the full sample period after controlling for competition 
and its interactions (Using PCM) 
  All industries   
  
 High Competition   Low competition  
  
  BLev LTLev  BLev LTLev  BLev LTLev 
  (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
SZ   0.064*** 0.032***  0.069*** 0.033***  0.057*** 0.030*** 
  (0.004) (0.003)  (0.006) (0.004)  (0.005) (0.004) 
          
PR   -0.436*** -0.157***  -0.304*** -0.088***  -0.501*** -0.227*** 
  (0.020) (0.013)  (0.028) (0.018)  (0.028) (0.019) 
          
TAN   0.074*** 0.098***  0.086*** 0.096***  0.058** 0.076*** 
  (0.018) (0.012)  (0.026) (0.016)  (0.023) (0.016) 
          
NDTS   -0.122 -0.062  0.036 0.061  -0.122 -0.129* 
  (0.081) (0.053)  (0.118) (0.076)  (0.100) (0.068) 
          
LIQ   -0.034*** -0.001  -0.038*** 0.003*  -0.030*** -0.006*** 
  (0.002) (0.001)  (0.003) (0.002)  (0.002) (0.001) 
          
VOL   0.073* 0.012  0.167*** 0.055  0.056 0.036 
  (0.044) (0.029)  (0.064) (0.043)  (0.058) (0.039) 
          
GR   -0.007 0.011***  -0.018*** 0.007  0.002 0.015*** 
  (0.005) (0.003)  (0.007) (0.005)  (0.006) (0.004) 
          
PCM  -0.061*** 0.004  -0.002 0.045  -0.031 0.024 
  (0.022) (0.016)  (0.036) (0.028)  (0.026) (0.018) 
          
_cons  -0.794*** -0.452***  -0.861*** -0.488***  -0.654*** -0.394*** 
  (0.067) (0.047)  (0.098) (0.065)  (0.097) (0.069) 
N  42120 42096  21479 21464  20641 20632 
r2  0.254 0.086  0.227 0.068  0.286 0.112 
N_clus
t 
 4196.000 4196.00
0 
 3282.000 3282.000  3264.000 3264.00
0 
This table presents the FE estimation results for the entire sample period. Standard errors robust to heteroscedasticity and clustering within 
firm are given in parentheses.  
The sample and variable definitions are as described in Table 2. 
⁎ Indicates significance at 10%, ⁎⁎ Indicates significance at 5%, ⁎⁎⁎ Indicates significance at 1%.   
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Table 8: Regression results for the joint role of competition and crisis (Dependent 
Variable: BLev) 
  High Competition  Low competition 
  Pre-crisis Crisis Post- crisis  Pre-crisis Crisis Post- crisis 
  (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
SZ   0.062*** 0.039** 0.059***  0.064*** 0.014 0.067*** 
  (0.010) (0.018) (0.014)  (0.009) (0.015) (0.010) 
         
PR  -0.186*** -0.129*** -0.097**  -0.378*** -0.158*** -0.130*** 
  (0.043) (0.040) (0.040)  (0.033) (0.055) (0.034) 
         
TAN   0.068* 0.054 0.060  -0.001 0.243*** 0.115*** 
  (0.041) (0.069) (0.039)  (0.028) (0.053) (0.031) 
         
NDTS   0.196 0.454* 0.157  0.034 0.020 -0.209 
  (0.184) (0.257) (0.158)  (0.122) (0.244) (0.141) 
         
LIQ   -0.025*** -0.003 -0.013***  -0.012*** -0.006 -0.007*** 
  (0.006) (0.005) (0.004)  (0.003) (0.004) (0.002) 
         
VOL   -0.024 -0.054 -0.066  -0.108 0.214 -0.111* 
  (0.118) (0.141) (0.076)  (0.086) (0.148) (0.065) 
         
GR   -0.006 -0.030** -0.010  -0.005 -0.005 0.007 
  (0.011) (0.012) (0.010)  (0.008) (0.012) (0.006) 
         
PCM  -0.179*** 0.093 -0.057  -0.107*** 0.004 -0.062* 
  (0.060) (0.065) (0.043)  (0.032) (0.059) (0.036) 
         
_cons  -0.777*** -0.432 -0.790***  -0.846*** -0.121 -0.991*** 
  (0.170) (0.308) (0.238)  (0.167) (0.260) (0.182) 
N  9561 5467 6451  10441 4245 5955 
r2  0.195 0.111 0.052  0.290 0.129 0.114 
N_clust  2474.000 2366.000 2265.000  2599.000 1963.000 2113.000 
 This table presents the FE estimation results for the leverage determinants by considering the joint role of competition and 
the crisis. Standard errors robust to heteroscedasticity and clustering within firm are given in parentheses. The sample and 
variable definitions are as described in Table 2. 
⁎ Indicates significance at 10%, ⁎⁎ Indicates significance at 5%, ⁎⁎⁎ Indicates significance at 1%.   
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Table 9: Financial crisis competition interaction 
  
 BLev LTLev  BLev LTLev 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
SZ 0.065*** 0.032***  0.064*** 0.031*** 
 (0.004) (0.003)  (0.004) (0.003) 
      
PR -0.431*** -0.157***  -0.441*** -0.147*** 
 (0.020) (0.013)  (0.017) (0.011) 
      
TAN 0.080*** 0.099***  0.071*** 0.097*** 
 (0.018) (0.012)  (0.018) (0.012) 
      
NDTS -0.121 -0.067  -0.126 -0.033 
 (0.080) (0.053)  (0.077) (0.050) 
      
LIQ -0.033*** -0.001  -0.036*** -0.002* 
 (0.002) (0.001)  (0.002) (0.001) 
      
VOL 0.082* 0.009  0.075* 0.017 
 (0.044) (0.029)  (0.042) (0.028) 
      
GR -0.006 0.011***  -0.008* 0.011*** 
 (0.005) (0.003)  (0.004) (0.003) 
      
PCM -0.054** -0.007    
 (0.022) (0.016)    
      
Crisis 0.007*** 0.004***  0.007*** 0.004*** 
 (0.002) (0.001)  (0.002) (0.001) 
      
Crisis * PCM -0.072*** -0.027**    
 (0.018) (0.012)    
      
High PCM    -0.006*** -0.001*** 
    (0.001) (0.001) 
      
Crisis * High PCM    -0.011*** -0.005*** 
    (0.002) (0.001) 
      
      
      
_cons -0.882*** -0.490***  -0.844*** -0.467*** 
 (0.068) (0.047)  (0.067) (0.047) 
N 41477 41453  45648 45624 
r2 0.255 0.087  0.259 0.084 
N_clust 4186.000 4186.000  4268.000 4268.000 
 
This table presents the FE estimation results for crisis competition interraction. Standard errors robust to 
heteroscedasticity and clustering within firm are given in parentheses. The sample and variable definitions are as 
described in Table 2. ⁎ Indicates significance at 10%, ⁎⁎ Indicates significance at 5%, ⁎⁎⁎ Indicates significance at 
1%.   
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 Figure 1: Line fit of detrended leverage and detrended firm-level variables
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Appendix 1: Regression results for the full sample period after controlling for 
competition and its interactions (Using HHI) 
 All Industries  High Competition  Low Competition 
 BLev LTLev  BLev LTLev  BLev LTLev 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
SZ 0.063*** 0.031***  0.062*** 0.030***  0.071*** 0.032*** 
 (0.004) (0.003)  (0.005) (0.004)  (0.005) (0.003) 
         
PR -0.466*** -0.155***  -0.376*** -0.110***  -0.572*** -0.211*** 
 (0.017) (0.010)  (0.023) (0.014)  (0.023) (0.015) 
         
TAN 0.071*** 0.097***  0.056** 0.091***  0.091*** 0.104*** 
 (0.018) (0.012)  (0.024) (0.015)  (0.024) (0.016) 
         
NDTS -0.158** -0.042  -0.191* -0.091  -0.084 0.021 
 (0.076) (0.050)  (0.100) (0.067)  (0.111) (0.070) 
         
LIQ -0.036*** -0.002  -0.038*** -0.002  -0.033*** -0.002 
 (0.002) (0.001)  (0.002) (0.001)  (0.003) (0.002) 
         
VOL 0.078* 0.018  0.168*** 0.040  -0.028 -0.012 
 (0.042) (0.028)  (0.055) (0.036)  (0.065) (0.045) 
         
GR -0.009** 0.011***  -0.019*** 0.008*  -0.001 0.012*** 
 (0.004) (0.003)  (0.006) (0.004)  (0.006) (0.004) 
         
HHI -0.005 -0.006*  -0.008 -0.015**  -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.005) (0.004)  (0.012) (0.008)  (0.006) (0.004) 
         
_cons -0.831*** -0.463***  -0.738*** -0.439***  -1.038*** -0.515*** 
 (0.066) (0.046)  (0.087) (0.062)  (0.094) (0.064) 
N 45648 45624  21984 21969  23664 23655 
r2 0.257 0.084  0.224 0.065  0.305 0.110 
N_clust 4268.000 4268.000  3155.000 3155.000  3484.000 3483.000 
This table presents the FE estimation results for the leverage determinants by considering the joint role of 
competition and the crisis. Standard errors robust to heteroscedasticity and clustering within firm are given in 
parentheses. The sample and variable definitions are as described in Table 2. 
⁎ Indicates significance at 10%, ⁎⁎ Indicates significance at 5%, ⁎⁎⁎ Indicates significance at 1%.   
 
 
